

ER 60-6037/a

16 AUG 1960

*sent*  
Mr. Seneca M. Gamble  
Advertising Manager  
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.  
Springfield 1, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Gamble:

Thank you for your letter of 2 August enclosing a copy of the open letter advertisement to the Vice President.

Your thoughtfulness in bringing this to our attention is appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

STAT  
O/DCI,  :bak(9 Aug. 60)

Distribution:

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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *J*)

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
Mr. Dulles:

The attached open letter to the Vice President urges the establishment of a new federal agency staffed by propaganda experts to meet Soviet propagandists on their own field of battle with their own weapons. The need for such a step is the alleged failure of our government to wage an effective battle to win over public opinion.

WE

10 August

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# MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL *Life Insurance Company*

SPRINGFIELD 1, MASSACHUSETTS • ORGANIZED 1851

August 2, 1960

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

You will, I believe, be interested in reading the enclosed open letter advertisement to Vice President Richard M. Nixon.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Seneca M. Gamble".

Seneca M. Gamble,  
Advertising Manager

SMG:jah  
Encls.

To: The Honorable Richard M. Nixon, *Vice President of the United States*

From: Daniel H. Lewis, *former Foreign Service Officer, President of Johnson & Lewis, Inc., Advertising San Francisco*

## Subject: National Security

**T**his is a time for straight thinking and plain talk. Our retreat in Japan has now become history. And written there for all to see is the fact that the United States was again left unprotected and helpless against the amazingly simple, amazingly effective Communist method of warfare.

How many times in recent years has the United States suffered humiliation and defeat by the same old enemy in the same old way? How many times have Communist-led, Kremlin-controlled street mobs battered their way through our defenses—toppling treaties, deposing governments, conquering countries?

*How many times do we have to lose before we learn Red Fascism must be fought with its own weapons, on its own battleground? That the weapon is propaganda and the battleground is world opinion?*

**Let there be no mistake. We have not begun to fight.** The Kremlin's political warfare and propaganda machine has been allowed to range throughout the world unopposed, defeating a United States unable even to find the arena of this war, much less do battle.

The extent of our inability to cope with this new concept of mass diplomacy is dramatically revealed by our Secretary of State's response to the anti-Eisenhower demonstrations in Japan: President Eisenhower does not plan any more good-will trips and the U. S. will return to "traditional channels and procedures of international contact." In other words, our policy is now to quit the field altogether and leave the Communists in sole possession of a diplomatic weapon so powerful it can confine our President to the continental limits of the United States!

The full measure of our decline now stands revealed. The cause is clear: the United States has consistently retreated before a weapon it does not understand, a diplomacy it disdains to use.

The repercussions of this new diplomacy extend far beyond the immediate victories which it wins for the Soviet Union. *Our concern for world opinion has been a direct factor in hobbling our military might in every crisis from the Korean War to the grounding of the U2.* The restrictive influence of Soviet-shaped public opinion, therefore, may have the most tragic consequences if it continues unaltered.

By what process of thinking have we arrived at the conclusion that we as a nation are incapable of waging a war of mass persuasion? Who are the men who refuse to turn the Communists' own weapons on the Kremlin? Who says such weapons are wrong? That it is wrong to tell the truth about Communism, to expose Red Fascism, with an international organization recruited and trained for this type of warfare?

Today there is no such organization, either in our own Government or abroad. There is no way in which the millions throughout the world who hate Communism can unify to find their voice and their strength. Our failure to provide this leadership is the tragedy of our time, the prescription for our defeat.

This, then, is a proposal for action. It is addressed to you because you have exposed Communism in the past. We ask you to do so again, on a global scale, with the world at stake.

This proposal is a matter of survival, not politics. It is neither Republican nor Democrat. If it implies criticism, neither party is blameless. If it implies hope, you have only to act.

## Resolution:

1. That there be created immediately a new Federal Agency, of cabinet status, responsible directly to the President, whose function it is to deter and defeat the Soviet propaganda apparatus throughout the world.

2. That this new Agency be directed to use every means at its disposal—including the advanced psychological techniques employed by the Communist propaganda underground—to create an awareness of the danger faced by free men everywhere.

3. That the major reason we have lost the cold war thus far is because the United States has never made any coordinated attempt to inform the free peoples of the world of the Soviet danger or the Soviet stated aim of world conquest.

4. That anti-Communist activities overseas have been assigned to a Federal Agency that does not emphasize propaganda and that is not, in fact, specialized or organized to carry on this vital type of warfare.

5. That our State Department's protestations of American good will, that our information and library program overseas, that our world-wide attempt to buy allies with foreign aid, are meek, defensive maneuvers incapable of defending the United States in this war for the minds of men.

6. That our so-called propaganda efforts of the past have been in the hands of idealistic amateurs who have dismissed any anti-Communist effort as "negative" and have preferred to talk about the "positive" virtues of America.

7. That effective propaganda cannot be delivered by American spokesmen overseas—it must be sounded by local voices within each country and it must deal with local issues, not American issues.

8. That the Kremlin always masks its true identity in its propaganda movements—and that its "Peace" and "Ban the Bomb" organizations in each country would be stripped of their effectiveness if they were known to be Moscow-controlled.

9. That we have failed completely to combat such Soviet maneuvers in local political arenas—that we have failed to seize upon the one local issue which we do have in common with every country in the free world, a common enemy.

10. That because we have never made a sustained, determined effort to tell the entire world the truth about Communism, we have failed to capitalize on the one thing that could unite the Free World—a common danger.

11. That the only true allies we have in this balance-of-power struggle are the countries whose people share the same awareness of the Soviet threat—and that the major objective of the Soviet "peace" campaign, now in its 15th year, is to keep our allies from realizing their danger.

12. That a world-wide propaganda organization—properly directed and staffed by dedicated patriots—could quickly counteract the effects of Soviet lies because the truth, scientifically told, is the most efficient propaganda weapon of all.

13. That such a war would be fought in the streets . . . with parades, speeches, demonstrations . . . in local-language newspapers, radio, magazines . . . with pamphlets, posters, slogans.

14. That such a war must be fought by foreign nationals—patriots whom the United States must find, organize, and educate in the same manner that the Soviet Union has spread its gospel of Communism.

15. That throughout the world there are millions of people who share a hatred of Communism in their own countries and who fear the Soviet path of aggression with the same degree of intensity found in the United States.

16. That because there has been no organized way for and Communism to express itself in foreign countries, patriots are led to believe that they are in the minority and that the highly organized Communist mob in the street is the voice of the people.

17. That when foreign anti-Communists are organized into leagues headed by local political leaders, they will suddenly find their strength—a mass strength of organized public opinion they never knew existed.

18. That such leagues—supported and encouraged by the Agency in Washington—would take the offensive against Communism in country after country, with scientific propaganda tactics developed within the Agency for use abroad.

19. That such tactics would be based on a world-wide propaganda theme to expose the Soviet Union as the true aggressor—a theme which would be echoed continuously by leading American spokesmen, both at home and abroad, to reinforce local overseas campaigns.

20. That to expose the Soviet Union in its true light will take a massive, coordinated propaganda offensive necessitating the co-operation of our Government leaders and other public figures whose words will command headlines abroad.

21. That only by using the scientific principles of propaganda—simplicity, continuity, and repetition—can we ever hope to reach the millions of people throughout the world with our vital message.

22. That the proposed Agency be composed, therefore, of the best available professional talent—men who think in terms of slogans, men who can write, and men who understand the basic principles of propaganda and mass persuasion.

23. That such a group of men be recruited immediately and given intensive indoctrination in the methods and objectives of the Agency—and that each man be sent to his overseas destination with a specific plan for action.

24. That once formed, the entire operation of the Agency and its overseas organizations must be conducted with the utmost secrecy—because the Soviet underground apparatus in each country will immediately respond by trying to seek out the identity of Agency operators in order to eliminate them.

25. That despite the hardships and the dangers there are hundreds of patriotic Americans who would volunteer for this opportunity to come to grips with the Soviet Union on its own field of battle—and with its own weapons.

## TO THE READERS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES . . .

If you agree with the views expressed here, please take action. The simplest, most immediate way is to tear out this page and mail it to Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Washington, D. C.

Urge action now! For further information, for reprints of this statement, or if you feel you would like to assist in any way, write D. H. Lewis, 433 California St., San Francisco 4, California.